STAR ARMY

Sci-fi roleplaying and worldbuilding community

User Tools

Site Tools


wip_2023_or_older:corp:lazarus:rhys:research

Lazarus research findings pre-Rhys

When Lorath's Armour-Works left to form Lazarus in YE-31, they were joined by many other design doctrines from many other nations. With this new clear objectivity they decided that instead of trying to prolong the life of the AMX-100 SERIES, they should instead start from the ground upward.

They began by first looking at what other nations had already fielded and their combat doctrines, trying to find a niche or gap or possible exploit and what they discovered absolutely shocked them.

Observation 1

Existing armour, frame and many other units were only designed for a one or two dimensional battlefield. They could only focus 80% of their attention in a single location at once and often lacked the software or hardware to really understand what they were looking at. As a result, they could only strike opponents infront of them or in their direct line of sight and had to work in groups, each unit looking in a different location.

Observation 2

They were not team-players. Observations had to be shared vocally over communications, such as spotting and identifying a target, occupying valuable pilot attention that could be spent better elsewhere. The units did not syncronise information in almost all cases with the exception of more recent Yamataian equipment and even then, there was no higher combat-awareness model to exploit this collective information.

Observation 3

Mixed groups of powered-armour in the field would often view frames as liabilities. Large, highly visible with huge vertical frontal profiles which could be spotted easily and lots of things to go wrong, infantry groups developed attitudes against them. Simply put, the unit didn't do enough to cover its own weaknesses or assist ground-crews who felt they had to babysit units, despite the obvious loadout advantages they offered. Consequently, their use is minimized.

Observation 4

Frames generally tend to squander their massive loadout potential. By having lots of different weapons feeding from lots of different ammunition sources and an entire paradigm of a 'selected weapon' over collections of weapons, frames often cannot properly leverage their armaments. As a result, their weapons often sit in back-bays unused during engagements, adding weight and limiting mobility. Consequently, a culture of 'the main weapon' has arisen, with this weapon being built around the focus of the unit. As a result, it can only engage one opponent at once. Even worse, units which could power huge starship grade weapons for brief alpha-strikes to break open an enemy line don't, simply because the work needed to keep them operational behind that line once pierced is unreasonable.

Observation 5

This squandering harms their survivability massively. With pilots compensating for the unwieldiness of frames and engaging opponents, they struggle to notice when attack comes from a new vector and cannot respond accordingly. Target fixation is the number one killer of power-armour and power-frame pilots in the field during direct engagements.

Observation 6

This 'mono culture' of single targets means lots of units must be deployed when often one would have sufficed. As a result, the capabilities of units have dropped as they are forced to work as a cohesive unit to remain effective, with raw performance exchanged for low cost โ€“ a focus on compromising rather than excelling, to avoid miniaturization and smart-systems and high potency technologies like aether because of cost. This is all done to minimise how much is 'squandered' and hugely reduces the capabilities of units in the field, making individual action in the field unimportant.

Observation 7

Mono-culture gives rise to the need to produce lots of units that specialize in very specific ways with huge compromises rather than a small number of balanced units which can be customized to suit a mission. This hurts a units ability to adapt to a change of situation as a whole, drastically reducing survivability and means a much greater number of unique components and special training and maintenance of these low cost components is required to manage the logistics of this combined fighting force, destroying its independence.

Observation 8

This lack of independence again means that the loadout and generator capacity of frames is hugely squandered, anchoring them to carriers, bases and starships. They should be excelling in surgent deep-penetration, scouting, first-strike and attrition defense, all very aggressive roles and yet they are relegated to interception, point-defense, patrol and shallow invasion assault/bombing roles, ruining their potency as a combat weapon.

Observation 9

Very few to none of these units have respectable fixed armaments. Integrated weapons are treated as fallback or reserve equipment, meaning parts that could be picking off multiple opponents lack the potency to do so quickly enough. This again, forces dependency on 'mono culture' style design.

Observation 10

While the components of units can be very rugged, their biggest repeated weakness is always the moving joints, linkages, cabling, transmission and fuel lines which once damaged severely hurt a units operational capabilities or disable it entirely, removing its ability to survive multiple strikes despite money being poured into the development of thicker heavier armour plating which is only a bandaid to this problem.


Quality:
wip_2023_or_older/corp/lazarus/rhys/research.txt ยท Last modified: 2023/12/27 08:10 by wes